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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1968, California has enacted and amended several laws designed to
increase the ability of persons with disabilities to access public businesses,
facilities, and accommodations, and promote their integration into mainstream
society.' The comprehensive statutory scheme includes the Unruh Civil Rights
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, May 2005; B.S., Nursing, California State
University, Sacramento 1993; B.S., Biology, California State University, Sacramento 1990.
1. See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 133 (1983) (stating that growth of
California's disability laws reflected the Legislature's intent to eliminate impediments encountered by disabled
persons and to promote their participation in the community); infra Part Il.A. 1-3.
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Act ("Unruh Act"), 2 the Disabled Persons Act ("DPA"),3 as well as several
provisions of the California Government Code
4 and Health and Safety Code. 5
Under these provisions, owners and operators of public businesses are directed to
accommodate persons with disabilities in providing goods and services.6
California businesses must also comply with federal laws and standards relating
to disability discrimination.
To redress aggrieved persons who are denied equal access or accommodation,
the Unruh Act and the DPA provide statutory damages remedies, 8 whereas suits
arising under federal law permit private plaintiffs to obtain only injunctive relief.9 A
sweeping beacon of light, these laws were intended to throw open the doors of shops,
restaurants, movie theaters and other public facilities to welcome persons with
disabilities into mainstream society by providing them with rights of access afforded
other members of society.'°
Along the path of ensuring equal rights of access, a tug of war has developed.
Although federal law provides only injunctive remedial relief," California law
permits aggrieved individuals to recover statutory damages.1 2 Some business
owners and California legislators believe that disability law, intended to secure
unfettered freedom from discrimination for disabled persons, has instead been
manipulated by some plaintiffs and attorneys for the purpose of recovering a
veritable buried treasure.' 3 California legislators, concerned about abuse of the
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 51.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004).
3. Id. §§ 54.1, 54.3.
4. CAL. GOv'T. CODE §§ 4450-58 (West 1995).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19955-59 (West 1992).
6. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004); CAL. GOv'T. CODE § 4450
(West 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19955 (West 1992).
7. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181-89 (1995).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52, 54.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-3(a), 12188(a)(1) (1995).
10. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 248 (1998) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (stating that the purpose of section 51 is to prevent racial and other forms of discrimination to the
benefit of both individuals and the community); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(M), at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446 (stating that the ADA was intended to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring those individuals into the
economic and social mainstream of American life").
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-3(a), 12188(a)(1).
12. See Doran v. Embassy Suites Hotel, No. C-02-1961, 2002 WL 1968166 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26,
2002) (interpreting the Unruh Act and the DPA as providing statutory damages for each offense).
13. See ADA Notification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3590: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. at 128-29 (2000) [hereinafter ADA Notification Subcomm.]
(including statement of Tammy K. Fields, Assistant County Attorney for Palm Beach County, Fla., that the
ADA was intended "to provide access for disabled persons ... [but not] to enrich attorneys who file cookie
cutter lawsuits and seek large attorney fee awards"); Edward Felsenthal, Disabilities Act is Being Invoked in
Diverse Cases, WALL ST. J., March 31, 1993 at B I (stating that since enactment of the ADA, "dozens of cases
have been filed over issues that many lawmakers never imagined when they voted for it"); Leonard Post,
Vineyards of Litigation: A Disabled Activist Sues 100 Wineries, 25 NAT'L L. J. 51, 1 (2003) (discussing litigious
plaintiff George S. Louie, who has sued over one-hundred wineries with public tasting rooms under both the
ADA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
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law by litigious plaintiffs, and the need to provide protection for businesses, have
contemplated ways to balance the rights and interests of all parties.'
4
In response to these concerns, California legislators proposed bills that would
impose notice requirements upon disabled individuals who intend to bring suit
against businesses for alleged violations of California disability discrimination
law.' 5 Considering California's long history of advocating for the rights of the
disabled and providing damages as a remedy for violation of its anti-
discrimination laws, the proposed notice requirements indicate that possible
changes are on California's horizon.' 6 This Comment suggests that the California
Legislature sought to address issues of non-compliance among business owners,
and proposed notice requirements in an attempt to strike an equitable balance
between the rights and needs of disabled persons and the concerns of business
owners.
17
Part II of this Comment will set forth the legislative histories of California
and federal disability anti-discrimination laws, providing insight into the purpose
of the laws, and perspective on the current state of the law. Part III evaluates the
advantages and disadvantages of the damages remedies available under
California law in order to provide an understanding of the issues and concerns
facing the California Legislature today. Part IV discusses the proposed California
notice requirements and explores the implications of such requirements. Finally,
in Part V, the future of the California disability damages debate is examined.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. California Law
1. The Unruh Civil Rights Act
California has a long-reaching history of anti-discrimination law. Extending
as far back as 1897, California law has prohibited discrimination against
individuals in places of public accommodation. 18 Codified in section 51 of the
California Civil Code, the section19 has been amended several times over the past
14. See infra Part V.B.
15. S.B. 69,2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); A.B. 209, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
16. See interview with Thomas Hudson, Legislative Director for Senator Rico Oler, in Sacramento, Cal.
(Oct. 28, 2003) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Hudson Interview] (asserting A.B.
209 was intended to lead to a paradigm shift in California disability law).
17. Cf. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 248, 17 Cal. 4th 670,
716 (1998) (discussing the purposes of section 51, including an intent to benefit potential discriminatees, and
"the community as a whole," and that section 51 thus "effectively strikes a balance between the interests of the
potential discriminator and those of the potential discriminatee").
18. See id. 952 P.2d at 229 (discussing history of the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 51.3 (West 1982).
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100 years.20 The predecessor to section 51 was enacted by the California
Legislature in 1897, fourteen years after the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the first federal public accommodation statute in the Civil Rights
Cases.21 Section 51 in 1905, and after two subsequent amendments in 1919 and
1923, it provided that:
[a]ll citizens within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns,
restaurants, hotels, eating houses, places where ice cream or soft drinks
of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, barber shops, bath
houses, theaters, skating rinks, public conveyances and all other places of
public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.22
For as long as California has proscribed discrimination in places of public
accommodation under section 51, it has also provided a damages remedy for
violation of the law. 3 The remedy available for violation of section 51 was
established in section 52, and provided that anyone who denied a citizen access
to any public accommodation or facility was liable for an amount not less than
one hundred dollars in damages.24 Thus, from its inception, section 51 sought to
obtain equality for its citizens by proscribing discrimination, commanding that
public places admit all citizens equally, and allowing aggrieved plaintiffs to
25recover damages to compensate for the harm.
As a civil rights act, subsequent amendments expanded both the classes of
persons protected by the law as well as the types of public accommodations to
which the law applied.26 In 1959, in what the California Supreme Court reasoned
was a legislative response to several appellate court rulings holding that section
51 did not protect African-Americans from exclusion from places such as private
schools and dentist offices, section 51 was significantly revised in two respects.27
First, the law was broadened to unequivocally prohibit discrimination in all
28business establishments. Second, an illustrative list that identified categories of
20. Curran, 952 P.2d at 229 (Mosk, J., concurring); see generally id. at 241-42 (dis-,ussing the various
amendments to section 51).
21. See id. at 229 (discussing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and the history of the Unruh
Act).
22. See id. at 229 (quoting stats. 1923, ch. 235, section 1).
23. See Swann v. Burkett, 26 Cal. Rptr, 286, 288 (1962) (stating that an 1893 California law permitted
recovery by individuals denied admission to "any place of public amusement" of actual damages plus $100
from the proprietor of the business).
24. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 214 n.6 (1970) (discussing evolution of section 52).
25. Curran, 952 P.2d at 248 (Mosk, J., concurring).
26. See id. at 229-30 (discussing history of section 51).
27. Id. at 229.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 1(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 2004) (amended 1959).
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protected persons was added to the law.2 9 As enacted, the 1959 revision stated
that:
[a]ll citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and
no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.3°
In addition, section 52 was amended to increase the damages penalty from
one hundred dollars to an amount equal to actual damages, plus a two hundred
fifty dollar penalty.'
In 1974, "sex" was added to prohibit gender-based discrimination,32 and in
1987, the Unruh Act was broadened to encompass discrimination against blind or
otherwise physically disabled individuals.33 A 1992 amendment eliminated the
"blindness" and "physical" distinctions, expanding the law to apply to all persons
with disabilities.34 In its current form, section 51 reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.35
To prevail on a section 51 claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the
defendant's violation was intentional.36 Damages are available under section 52
to prevailing plaintiffs in the amount of up to three times the actual damages and
no less than $4,000 in statutory damages.37
Courts have reasoned that the various amendments to the Unruh Act over the
last eighty years indicate the California Legislature's intent to clarify and expand
29. See Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 216 (stating that the nature of the law, as well as judicial interpretation and
legislative history of the Unruh Act, indicate that the specified protected categories listed as part of the 1959
amendments are illustrative rather than restrictive); Harris v. Capital Growth Investors, 805 P.2d 873 (1991)
(affirming the Cox interpretation).
30. Curran, 952 P.2d at 230.
31. See Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 214 (discussing history of the Unruh Act).
32. Curran, 952 P.2d at 242 ((Mosk, J., concurring).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 2004) (amended 1987).
34. Curran, 952 P.2d at 242 (Mosk, J., concurring).
35. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51(b).
36. Hankins v. El Torito Rests., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 4th 510, 517-18 (1998).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a); see Boemio v. Love's Rest., 954 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(interpreting "actual damages [to] include both special damages for out-of-pocket losses and general damages
for emotional distress").
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the coverage of the law to benefit all persons within California, and protect them
from arbitrary discrimination in public places.38
2. The Disabled Persons Act
In 1968, California enacted its first law directed specifically at prohibiting
discrimination based on disability. 39 As enacted, section 54.1 of the California
Civil Code, known as the DPA,4° provided an illustrative list of public places in
which individuals with disabilities were "entitled to full and equal access" stating
that:
[bllind persons, visually handicapped persons, and other physically disabled
persons shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the
general public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses,
streetcars, boats or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation,
hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or
resort, and other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law, or state or federal
41regulation, and applicable alike to all persons.
Also enacted in 1968, section 54.3 declared that it was a misdemeanor for
anyone to deny a disabled individual equal access to a public place in violation of
the DPA.42 Determining that enforcement of the DPA was proving to be
problematic, the Legislature amended section 54.3 four years later to provide a
damages remedy, with the goal of increasing compliance and enforcement of the
law.43 In 1976, a violation of the DPA carried a penalty of actual damages plus a
maximum of $500 in punitive damages for each offense, and in 1977 the amount
of punitive damages was raised to $1,000. 44 A 1981 amendment eliminated the
cap on punitive damages and created a statutory penalty of no less than $250, as
well as, allowing for recovery of attorney's fees and the right to recover actual
damages.45
38. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 248 (Mosk, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose of section 51 is to
prevent racial and other forms of discrimination to the benefit of both individuals and the community).
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 54.1 (West 1982) (originally enacted as Stat. 1968, ch. 461, § 1, 1092).
40. See Goldman, 341 F.3d at 1027 n.4 (explaining that although courts have sometimes referred to
section 54.1 as comprising part of the Unruh Act, only sectior 51 actually comprises the Unruh Act, and noting
that the sections impose different requirements of proof).
41. See Marsh v. Edward Theatres Circuit, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 881, 886-87 (1976) (discussing the
history of section 54.1) (superseded by statute on other grounds).
42. See Donald v. Caf6 Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 179 (1990) (discussing the history of section
54.1 and applicable remedies).
43. Id. at 179-80.
44. Id. at 179.
45. Id.
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In 1974, section 55 was enacted, establishing a private right of action for
injunctive relief, available to any individual aggrieved or potentially aggrieved by a
violation of the DPA.46 Currently, section 54.3 permits a successful plaintiff to
recover actual damages and a statutory penalty "up to a maximum of three times the
amount of actual damages but in no case less than $1,000" plus attorney's fees.47
Since its enactment, the scope of the DPA has been expanded to include access
to leased housing accommodations, 48 and telephone facilities, 49 and has established
prohibitions against the refusal of admittance or service to disabled persons with
guide or service dogs. 50 However, unlike the Unruh Act, the DPA only requires a
plaintiff to establish that she or he was denied access on a particular occasion, not
that the defendant intentionally violated the law.5' Construing this requirement
broadly, courts have determined that company policies that result in denial of equal
access violate the DPA,52 as does conduct that merely deters persons with disabilities
from seeking access.53 Such a broad reading of the statute provides maximum
protection to individuals who need not make a futile or possibly humiliating gesture
of attempting to seek access where it is clear that access will be denied,54 and
requires businesses to modify business policies in order to make reasonable
accommodations.
55
Although actual and statutory damages are available under both the Unruh Act
and the DPA, 56 the California Legislature has not provided for unlimited punitive
damages or daily damages, the latter defined as damages accruing for each day that a
plaintiff is denied access until the facility is brought into compliance. 57 Thus, the
58Legislature sought to establish reasonable limits of recovery.
46. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 55 (West 1982); Donald, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 179.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54.3, 55.
48. Id. § 54.1(b)(1) ( amended 1969).
49. Id. § 54.1(a)(2) (amended 1977).
50. Id. § 54.1(c) (amended 1994).
51. Id. § 54.1; Boemio v. Love's Rest., 954 F. Supp. 204, 207-08 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
52. See Hankins v. El Torito Rests., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 4th 510, 515-16, 522-23 (1998) (holding that the
restaurant violated section 54.1 by refusing to permit patrons the use of an employee restroom located on the
first floor of the restaurant, despite the inability of a disabled patron to climb the eighteen stairs leading to a
second floor public restroom).
53. See Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 433, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (ruling in
favor of disabled plaintiffs who alleged they were deterred from attempting to attend movie theaters because of
their knowledge that the theaters did not provide adequate disabled access).
54. Id. at 438.
55. See Hankins, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 523-24 (stating that the DPA incorporated ADA Title HI standards,
and that in accordance with Title III, business owners must "make 'reasonable modifications' in their practices,
policies or procedures" to accommodate individuals with disabilities, unless an exception applies).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 52, 54.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004).
57. See Doran v. Embassy Suites Hotel, No. C-02-1961, 2002 WL 1968166 at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26,
2002) (interpreting the Unruh Act and the DPA as providing statutory damages for each offense, but not for
unlimited punitive or daily damages).
58. See id. at *2-3 (denying plaintiffs request for punitive damages in addition to statutory damages).
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3. California Government Code Section 4450 and California Health and Safety
Code Section 19955.
In 1968, California enacted Government Code section 4450.59 After several
subsequent amendments, the law currently states that:
[i]t is the purpose of this chapter to ensure that all buildings, structures,
sidewalks, curbs and related facilities constructed in this state by the use
of the state, county, or municipal funds... shall be accessible and usable
by persons with disabilities. The State Architect shall develop and submit
proposed building standards to the California Building Standards
Commission for approval and adoption.., and shall develop other
regulations for making buildings, structures, sidewalks, curbs and related
facilities accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.
60
As enacted, section 4450 applied only to publicly funded buildings. In 1969,
California added section 19955 of the Health and Safety Code to make section
4450 applicable to privately funded construction.6' Currently, section 19955
states that:
[t]he purpose of this part is to insure that public accommodations or
facilities constructed in this state with private funds adhere to the
provisions of Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 4450)... [flor
purposes of this part "public accommodation or facilities" means a
building, structure, facility, complex, or improved area which is used by
the general public and shall include auditoriums, hospitals, theaters,
restaurants, hotels, motels, stadiums and convention centers.
62
These statutes require that affirmative action need only be taken in the design
and construction of new facilities, or in the repair and alteration of existing
facilities.63 Additionally, the law provides for certain exceptions, including a
hardship exception. 64 Historically, an action based on violation of sections 4450
and 19955 may seek enforcement of the provisions, but damages were not
available. 6 In October 2003, however, the California Legislature passed a
controversial bill calling for strict liability for building code violations that deny
access to persons with disabilities, and permitting the government to recover a
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 4450 (West 1995) (added by Stat. 1968, ch. 261, § 1).
60. Id.
61. People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 132 (1983).
62. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19955 (West 1992).
63. Hankins v. El Torito Rests., 63 Cal. App. 4th 510, 522 (1998).
64. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19957 (providing that an exception may be granted from the
literal requirements of the law where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships).
65. Donald v. Caf6 Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 183-84 (1990); Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp.
2d 1047, 1052 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting Donald).
668
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statutory damages penalty of $2,500.66 Courts have interpreted the various
provisions of Chapter 872 as part of California's goal of furthering the state's
policy of providing broad protections to persons with disabilities, and
maximizing business' incentive for compliance.67
Taken together, the combined statutory scheme of California disability law
reflects the Legislature's sensitivity to the hardships endured by individuals with
disabilities, and the firm commitment to policy that encourages participation of
persons with disabilities in the social and economic mainstream of society. 68
Moreover, the many amendments to the Unruh Act and the DPA that expanded
the scope of disability anti-discrimination law, as well as the increase in the
amount of statutory damages available to remedy violations, demonstrate the
Legislature's intent to guarantee access, promote safety, compensate disabled
persons for injuries suffered, and compel business owners to comply with the
law.69
B. Federal Law: The Americans with Disabilities Act
Federal anti-discrimination law, as applicable to individuals with disabilities,
was slower to evolve. In 1990 Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"). 70  Title III of the ADA ("Title III") specifically prohibits
discrimination against individuals on the basis of disability in places of public
accommodation. 71 Title III states that:
[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation
by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation.72
66. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 4458 (West 1995) (amended by Chapter 872); id. §§ 4459.5-9.8 (added by
Chapter 872); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 19954, 19958.5 (amended by Chapter 872); id. § 19958.6
(added by Chapter 872); see infra Part IV.
67. Hankins, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 523.
68. Cf People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 133 (1983) (stating that section
54.1 and other codes designed to remedy disability discrimination "were part of 'a growing body of legislation
intended to reduce or eliminate the physical impediments" faced by the disabled) (quoting Marriage of Carney,
598 P.2d 36 (1979)).
69. See Hankins, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 522 (noting section 54.1 is intended to facilitate access to public
accommodations by the physically handicapped); see also Donald, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 179 (discussing
expansion of the DPA); Doran v. Embassy Suites Hotel, No. C-02-1961, 2002 WL 1968166 at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 26, 2002) (concluding that the Legislature took the importance of disability rights into account when it
drafted the minimum statutory damages).
70. See Elizabeth Keadle Markey, The ADA 's Last Stand?: Standing and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 71 FORDHAm L. REV. 185, 187-88 (2002) (discussing enactment of the ADA).
71. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 12181-12189 (1995).
72. Id. § 12182(a).
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Congress declared that the ADA was intended to "provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and to bring those individuals into the economic and social
mainstream of American life.
' 73
As introduced, the various ADA bills proposed rights and remedies that were
stronger than those ultimately enacted. 4 Primarily, the original bills called for the
right of an aggrieved individual to seek both injunctive relief and monetary
damages. 5 However, legislative hearings culminated in a compromise between
those who sought strict provisions that would compel compliance by providing a
compensatory and punitive damages remedy, and proponents who desired to
limit litigation, avoid the imposition of undue hardship on small businesses, and
yet provide a broad scope of coverage.76
The successful argument propounded by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
cautioned that many people in a litigious society such as ours are quick to bring
suit where punitive damages are available, and that the injunctive relief remedies
available under Title II of the Civil Rights Act ("CRA" or "CRA Title I")
77
would be an appropriate remedy for ADA Title III violations.78 Senator Tom
Harkin, however, believed that a damages remedy would be necessary in order to
achieve widespread voluntary compliance, and that a limited remedial scheme
would lead to under-enforcement of Title 111.
79
Under the resulting compromise, Title III permits the United States Attorney
General to bring an action against anyone determined to be engaging in
discriminatory practices that deny an individual with a disability access to a
public accommodation. 80 An action brought by the Attorney General may seek
equitable remedies including injunctive relief, as well as, monetary damages not
to exceed $50,000 for a first violation, or $100,000 for any subsequent
violation.81 Private parties who bring suit for violation of ADA Title III,
however, may recover only the remedies available under the CRA as set forth in
section 2000a-3(a) of Title 42.82
73. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(m1), at 23 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,446.
74. Ruth Colker, ADA Title 111: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 377, 382-83
(2000).
75. Id. at 383.
76. See id. at 392-93 (describing the exchange between Senator Tom Harkin and Attorney General Dick
Thornburgh over the appropriate remedial structure).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1995).
78. Colker, supra note 74, at 393-94.
79. Id. at 392-93.
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (1995).
81. Id. §§ 12188(b)(1)-(b)(2)(C).
82. Id. §§ 2000a-3(a), 12188(a)(1).
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Enacted in 1964, CRA Title II prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation based on race, color, national origin, or religion,83 and provides
an aggrieved individual the right to bring a civil action for injunctive relief and
recovery of attorney's fees. 84 However, the statute first requires the aggrieved
party to give written notice of the alleged violation to the appropriate State or
local authority, and imposes a subsequent thirty-day waiting period before suit
can be filed.85 However, because ADA Title III has been interpreted by courts to
incorporate only the injunctive relief provision of CRA Title II, it does not
impose an administrative exhaustion or notice requirement.86 Attorney's fees,
however, are available under Title III to a prevailing party.
87
Congress thus sought to balance the goal of promoting access for persons with
disabilities with a need to protect small business owners from undue hardship.
88
Although there was some disagreement among legislators, a compromise was
eventually reached.89 To advance the rights of disabled individuals, ADA Title EIl
mandates that the owner or operator of a business may not deny a person with a
disability the opportunity to participate in the services, facilities or accommodations
offered by the business, 90 or provide accommodation that is different or separate
from that provided to the general public.9' An owner must make reasonable
modifications to any policies, practices, or procedures that would result in
discrimination against anyone with a disability.92 However, no such modification is
required where the result would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges or advantages of the business, or where such modification would
impose an undue burden on the business.
93
83. See id. § 2000a(a) (stating that "[aill persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation...
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.").
84. Id. § 2000a-3(a)-(b).
85. Id. § 2000a-3(c).
86. Id. §§ 2000a-3(a), 12188(a)(1); see, e.g., Am. Bus Ass'n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(denying recovery of damages to private plaintiff for Title III violation, reasoning that the language of the
statute restricting recovery of money damages to suits brought by the Attorney General evidences Congress'
intent that damages would not be available to other plaintiffs); Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1050
(S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that Title III does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies as is required
under Title I employment claims); Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Title III does not require plaintiffs to give notice to any state agency prior to filing suit).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 20020a-3(b).
88. See Colker, supra note 74, at 384 (explaining Attorney General Thornburgh's objections to a broader
version of Title III, including a recommendation that "the scope of businesses covered by ADA Title III should
be narrowed so as not to impose undue hardship on small businesses").
89. Id. at 383-85.
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (1995).
91. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
92. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
93. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
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Additionally, the requirements imposed upon facilities vary, depending on
whether the facility is newly designed and constructed,94 is altered or renovated after
the enactment of the ADA,95 or existed prior to the enactment of the ADA.96 Design
and construction of any new facility must conform to ADA standards.9 7 Similarly,
any alterations made to an existing facility must also comply with ADA standards
and be readily accessible to persons with disabilities.98 However, existing facilities
not undergoing renovation are required to remove architectural barriers only where
such removal is "readily achievable," as determined by the consideration of a number
of factors. 99 The factors to be considered include the nature and cost of the action that
would need to be undertaken, the business' overall financial resources, the impact of
modification upon the business, the number of employees, the function of the
workforce, and the type of operations conducted by the business and its location.'
°
Determination of whether a particular modification is "reasonable" therefore requires
a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis.10'
Finally, ADA Title IMI directed the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")
to promulgate regulations that would implement Title Im standards. 102 The resultant
regulations were adopted in July 1991 in Title 28 C.F.R., Part 36, and are generally
known as the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines
("ADAAG").' °3 The ADAAG regulations set forth the specific and detailed
requirements and measurements that facilities must comply with, and regulate
everything from public restrooms and wheelchair ramps to automated teller machines
and parking spaces. 104
C. Changes to California Law after Enactment of ADA Title III
After enactment of the ADA, both the Unruh Act and the DPA were amended to
incorporate ADA standards, declaring that a violation of the ADA would also
94. Id. § 12183(a)(1).
95. Id. § 12183(a)(2).
96. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v).
97. Id. § 12183(a)(1).
98. Id. § 12182(a)(2).
99. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
100. Id. §§ 12181(9)(A)-(D).
101. Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
204 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the fundamental nature of services provided by professional
golfers' association would not be altered by permitting disabled golfer to use golf cart during tournaments),
affd, 532 U.S. 661; Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Concorde Gaming Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1365
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that installation of an elevator in a casino ship was not "readily achievable" based on a
projected cost of $200,000, the necessity to dry-dock the ship for two months during installation, and the need
to obtain re-certification as a commercial passenger vessel).
102. See United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing
role of United States Attorney General and DOJ in promulgating of ADAAG regulations).
103. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36 App. A (2003).
104. See, e.g., id. §§ 4.16-4.24.7 (restrooms and water closets), 4.8-4.84 (wheelchair ramps), 4.34-
4.34.5 (automated teller machines), 4.6-4.6.6 (parking spaces).
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constitute a violation of the Unruh Act and the DPA. 10 5 The incorporation of ADA
standards into California law has been interpreted by courts as an indication of
legislative intent to strengthen California disability law where it is weaker than the
ADA, but retaining state law where it provides more protection for individuals with
disabilities than does the ADA.106 Accordingly, places of public accommodation in
California must meet minimal ADA Title MI requirements in order to comply with
California law.'07 The result is a comprehensive blueprint requiring compliance both
with state law and with the detailed and complex provisions of the federal ADAAG
regulations, and which also retains the ability of private plaintiffs to recover statutory
damages and attorney's fees.
108
III. THE DEBATE OVER DAMAGES
The myriad of California and federal disability discrimination law might lead
one to conclude that persons with disabilities are well protected and afforded the
greatest possible degree of access to public accommodations. However, this is
not always the case. °9 To complicate matters, the California Legislature is facing
growing and multi-faceted issues related to disability discrimination. 1° Some
legislators and business owners claim that the laws are being manipulated by
litigious plaintiffs to accomplish ends not intended by the laws."' Competing
interests and concerns of fairness have divided legislators. 1 2 It has been
suggested that without the availability of damages, the law would be ineffective
in commanding full compliance by business owners,' 3 and would deter
individuals from filing suit. 1 14 This would hinder achievement of the ultimate
105. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 51(0, 54.1(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 2004); A.B. 1077, 1992 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1992).
106. Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. See id. at 1031 (stating that that incorporation of Title II standards was intended as a model for
California law, "putting a floor on coverage for the disabled, not a cap on liability").
108. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(f), 52, 54.1(d), 54.3.
109. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 60 (including statements from Christine Griffin,
Executive Director, Disability Law Center).
110. See, e.g., Interview with Kevin O'Neill, Legislative Director for Assemblyman Tim Leslie, in
Sacramento, Cal. (Feb. 10, 2004) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter O'Neill Interview]
(affirming the legislature's goal of promoting access for the disabled, but expressing concern for small
businesses forced to shut down because they can't afford to pay damages and attorney's fees when sued for
technical violations of the law).
111. See Felsenthal, supra note 13, at B 1 (stating that since enactment of the ADA, "dozens of cases
have been filed over issues that many lawmakers never imagined when they voted for it"); Post, supra note 13,
at 1 (2003) (discussing litigious plaintiff George S. Louie).
112. See Hudson Interview, supra note 16 (discussing partisan character of proposed notice requirement
in California).
113. Cf Colker, supra note 74, at 392 (quoting Senator Harkin's position during ADA hearings that
"without the existence of damages as a remedy, [there would not be] widespread voluntary compliance or
negotiated settlements, short of litigation").
114. Cf id. at 399-401 (supporting conclusion that Title II's remedial scheme deters individuals from
bringing suit based on research of reported court data).
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goal of disability discrimination law: to ensure that no individual is discriminated
against because of a disability and to ensure the full and equal enjoyment of
public accommodations." 5
Conversely, some critics contend that self-serving plaintiffs file lawsuits
based on alleged violations of state and federal disability law for the sole purpose
of recovering damages,' 16 and that unscrupulous attorneys have their eyes set on
large attorney's fees." 7 Outcry and protest by business owners raise concerns of
unreasonable punishment imposed upon them. These punishments take the form
of having to pay damages for minor infractions of the law, or for violations of
which they were not aware, believing in good faith that their business complied
with the laws.'
18
Legislators are sensitive to both sides of the issue, and are aware that many
persons with disabilities continue to encounter exclusion or hindrance in their
ability to access public businesses and services." 9 The competing concerns have
led legislators to propose possible means of balancing the interests of individuals
with disabilities with those of business owners.
120
A. Advancing Access versus Litigiousness
No one appears to dispute that the goal of California and federal disability
law is to promote access to public places for persons with disabilities. 12 1
115. Cf id. at 394 (stating that "Title I has not been sufficiently effective in eliminating barriers to
access for individuals with disabilities").
116. See Shannon Lafferty, Jury Rejects ADA Claim Against Clint Eastwood, RECORDER, Oct. 2, 2000,
at 3 (discussing opinion of Clint Eastwood concerning plaintiff who sued a resort owned by Eastwood); Mary
Fricker, Taking Access Issues to Court: Advocates for Disabled Have Filed More Than 100 Suits Against North
Coast Businesses, Drawing Praise, Criticism, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa), Sept. 14, 2003, at El (discussing
prolific plaintiff, George S. Louie, who has recovered significant amounts of money in attorney's fees and
damages under California disability laws, as well as money from settlement agreements).
117. See Snyder v. San Diego Flowers, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that the
"goals of the ADA do not include creating an incentive for attorneys to seek statutory fees by laying traps for
those who are ignorant of the law."), rev'd on other grounds, Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827
(9th Cir. 2000); Sen. Inouye's Statement on the Introduction of S. 782, 107th Cong. (2001), Congressional
Record, at S3998, http://www.ohiosilc.org/il/hr3590/inouyejremarks.html (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) [hereinafter Inouye's Statement] (stating that Title I's lack of a notice requirement has prompted
some attorneys to sue businesses for minor infractions that would be inexpensive to remedy, seeking costly
attorneys fees and expenses).
118. See, e.g., ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 45-46 (statement of Terri L. Davis,
Business Manager, discussing utilization of independent consultants to ensure ADA compliance, and
subsequent lawsuit that alleged the company provided an inadequate number of handicapped parking spaces).
119. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (stating that no one wants to deny disabled persons access to
public facilities, and that businesses must work in good faith toward compliance).
120. Hudson Interview, supra note 16.
121. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (affirming that the legislature does not seek to deny access to
any individual); cf Inouye's Statement, supra note 117 (supporting ADA notification requirement, but stating
that "I do not suggest or approve of any changes to the ADA that would weaken its substantive requirements for
reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities."); ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 8
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Disability activists and legislators alike agree that all individuals are entitled to
equal access to public accommodations. 22 The many amendments to the Unruh
Act and the DPA, as well as the enactment of ADA Title III are clear evidence of
this goal.123 Moreover, the availability of damages under the Unruh Act and the
DPA demonstrate the California Legislature's desire to compensate aggrieved
individuals and compel compliance among businesses. 1
24
In attempting to take advantage of the goods and services offered by public
places such as movie theaters, restaurants, and stores, persons with disabilities
have faced multiple obstacles depriving them of equal access, sometimes to the
point of embarrassment. 25 Several California cases describe such situations and
the predicaments encountered by persons with disabilities on a daily basis.
26
For example, in Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants,27 a restaurant patron who
was disabled as a result of a partial leg amputation faced the nearly impossible
feat of having to climb eighteen steps on crutches in order to use the only public
restroom in the restaurant. 128 The manager denied the patron's request to use an
employee restroom located on the first floor, and instead directed the patron to
try the restaurant next door.' 29 The difficult journey to the other restaurant
included navigation across seventy-five yards of parking lot. Upon finding that
the other restaurant was also inaccessible, the patron, unable to wait any longer,
relieved himself in a bush located in the parking lot. 30 This is not an isolated
occurrence-other disabled persons have also had to resort to public urination. 131
In a similar incident, 32 plaintiff Theodore A. Pinnock alleged that while
patronizing a restaurant, he discovered that the restroom would not accommodate
(quoting Chairman Charles T. Canady as saying "There is widespread agreement that the [ADA] furthers the
admirable goal of providing for an accessible environment for the disabled").
122. See People ex rel. Deukmajian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123 (1983); see ADA Notification
Subcomm., supra note 13, at 56 (including statement of Christine Griffin, Executive Director of Disability Law
Center, Inc. of Boston, Massachusetts, describing the law center's mission of promoting access and
independence for disabled persons).
123. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 229 (1998)
(Mosk, J., concurring) (discussing amendments to the Unmh Act); People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150
Cal. App. 3d 123, 135 (1983), quoting Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (1979) (stating that section 54.1 and
other codes designed to remedy disability discrimination "were part of 'a growing body of legislation intended
to reduce or eliminate the physical impediments" faced by the disabled).
124. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 52, 54.3 (West 1982); see, e.g., Donald v. Caf6 Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d
168, 179-80 (1990) (discussing enactment of damages remedy for violations of the DPA).
125. See, e.g., infra notes 127-145 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. 63 Cal. App. 4th 510 (1998).
128. Id. at 515.
129. Id.
130. id. at515-16.
131. See, e.g., Boemio v. Love's Rest., 954 F. Supp. 204, 206 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that wheelchair-
bound patron was entitled to actual damages after patron discovered that the restaurant's restroom would not
accommodate his wheelchair, and alleging he was forced to urinate in the parking lot).
132. Pinnock v. Int'l House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
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his wheelchair. 133 In order to use the restroom facilities, Pinnock removed
himself from his wheelchair and crawled into the restroom.
134
Persons with disabilities have also found themselves excluded from elevated
dining areas because of wheelchair inaccessibility. 35 In Donald v. Cafj Royale,
Inc.,136 patron James Donald decided to leave a restaurant rather than choose
either to dine with his companion in the lower bar area, or accept an employee's
offer to physically carry Donald up the steps to the raised dining area.1 37 In
addition to humiliation, the latter option also posed the potential for physical
danger to Donald should he be dropped during the transfer.
138
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE139 provides another example of unequal
accommodation. There, the government alleged that the handicapped entrance
into a certain restaurant was not equivalent to the entrance provided to able-
bodied persons. 140 The public entrance offered a glass and wood door and led into
a foyer decorated with plants and skylights. Customers proceeded to a wood-
paneled staircase, atop of which stood the maitre d'. Physically disabled persons,
on the other hand, had to use an undecorated first floor employee entrance that
remained locked during business hours. 1
41
Persons with disabilities have also faced obstacles due to noncompliance
with ADAAG regulations. Examples of noncompliance leading to unequal
access include inadequate handicapped parking, entrance ramps that are difficult
to navigate, 142 and grossly disparate and non-integrated wheelchair seating areas
in theaters where persons who use wheelchairs are required to sit very close to
the screen. 143 For some individuals, a minor deviation from specific regulations
can amount to a major obstacle. 144 For example, seemingly inconsequential
variations from ADAAG code regulations can mean the difference between a
paraplegic individual having or not having enough space to accomplish a
successful wheelchair-to-toilet transfer. 145 The nature and extent of frustrating
133. Id. at 578.
134. Id.
135. Donald v. Caf6 Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 173 (1990).
136. Id. at 173-74.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 150 Cal. App. 3d 123 (1983).
140. Id. at 128.
141. Id.
142. Sharp v. Waterfront Rests., No. 99-CV-200, 1999 WL 1095486, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1999).
143. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2003).
144. See Fricker, supra note 116, at El (stating that matters that seem insignificant to other members of
the public can be important to a person who uses a wheelchair, such as the height of a grab bar needed to
transfer to a toilet).
145. See id. (discussing how small deviations from code regulations may make a wheelchair to toilet
transfer more difficult).
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experiences frequently endured by persons with disabilities are virtually endless,
and are the experiences disability laws seek to remedy.
146
Lawsuits filed for violation of disability discrimination laws often seek
injunctive relief, in the hope that courts will order removal of the barriers that
prevent individuals with disabilities from enjoying public places in the same
manner as able-bodied individuals.1 47 In addition, many aggrieved persons seek
and are awarded damages under California law as compensation for their
injury. 148 The Legislature's adoption of a damages remedy and the award of such
damages by courts indicate recognition of the hardships and obstacles faced
regularly by persons with disabilities, and the desire to create a public
environment accessible to all people. 1
49
Four years after the enactment of the DPA, the California Legislature
recognized that providing a damages remedy would help compel enforcement.
1 50
Many disability activists believe that without the ability to recover damages,
businesses would simply choose to remain out of compliance with the law,
gambling that, even if sued, the most severe consequence would amount only to a
mandate to modify existing policies and practices. 151 What this argument does
not account for, however, is that attorney's fees, recoverable under both federal
and state disability law, can amount to significantly greater sums than the cost to
modify a restroom or to add a wheelchair ramp. 152 The fact that numerous courts
have awarded substantial costs and attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs
146. See Donald v. Caf6 Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 177-78 (1990) (stating that "[t]he various
legislative pronouncements of our state's policy leave no doubt that the purpose of section 54 et seq. and section
19955 et seq. is to reduce or eliminate the physical impediments to participation in community life by the
physically handicapped") (referencing In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 738 (1979)).
147. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127 (1983) (seeking order
to compel restaurant to provide handicapped entrance equal to general public entrance that was not navigable by
wheelchairs); Hankins v. El Torito Rests., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 4th 510, 514 (1998) (seeking order compelling
restaurant to alter it's policy in order to provide patrons with a handicapped accessible restroom).
148. See, e.g., Hankins, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 516, 531 (affirming trial court's award of $80,000 to
disabled restaurant patron as damages for restaurant's violation of California's disability discrimination laws).
149. See, e.g., ex rel. Deukmejian, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 135 (stating that enactment of the various
disability laws reflects the California Legislature's "sensitivity to the hardships suffered by those afflicted with
a wide range of physical disabilities [and] are part of an expanding legislative effort to attain" the goal of
integration with mainstream society).
150. See Donald, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 179 (stating that "[iut is plain to see the Legislature's purpose in
imposing increased penalties and additional enforcement methods [under the DPA] is to guarantee compliance
with equal access requirements").
151. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 92 (including statement of Baltimore attorney
Andrew Levy that the ADA is weak legislation because it does not provide for damages, and thus a person or
business could knowingly or intentionally violate it for years, and still not be liable for damages. Additionally,
because there is no risk of having to pay damages "the effect of requiring notice is to encourage people to do
nothing until they get a letter").
152. Cf Mike Hoyem, ADA Cases Catch Defendants by Surprise, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers), Sept. 15,
2003, at 6A (stating that attorney's fees can range from $5,000 to $10,000 or more per case).
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suggests that most business owners would rather no be sued simply to postpone
compliance with the law.
153
Accordingly, those opposed to the availability of damages allege that some
plaintiffs are litigious simply for the purpose of recovering damages, and not for
the purpose of advancing access for disabled persons. 54 Plaintiffs can plead
ADA violations to get into federal court, and attach California state law claims in
order to recover damages.155 Because the Unruh Act and the DPA incorporate the
ADA, technical violations of the ADAAG may entitle plaintiffs to "hang their
hat" on the strict minutiae of the federal regulations in order to recover state law
damages, or alternatively, demand an essentially coerced settlement. 156 Even
courts and legislators have recognized the litigiousness of certain individual
plaintiffs. 1
57
For example, in Louie v. Ideal Cleaners,158 a California federal court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs, George S. Louie and Bamabus Fairfield, had
filed more than thirteen disability discrimination suits in that court alone, and that
these plaintiffs often filed separate lawsuits against the same defendants. 159 Louie
and Fairfield, both disabled, alleged that while patronizing a dry cleaning
business, they were denied access to the restroom because of a too-narrow
doorway. 160 The court made short work of granting summary judgment to the
defendant. 161 The court found that the restroom was an employee-only restroom,
and that Fairfield's unilateral attempt to use it did not make it a public
restroom.162 Both federal and California disability law state that individuals with
153. See, e.g., Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. C-95-0447, 1999 WL 33227443, at * 1, 7
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 1999) (awarding plaintiff $538,249 in costs and attorney's fees after plaintiff was granted
summary judgment on his ADA claims); MacDougal v. Catalyst Nightclub, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1102, 1107
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (awarding plaintiff more than $43,000 in costs and attorney's fees after the parties entered into
a settlement agreement).
154. See Hoyem, supra note 152, at 6A; see L. Stuart Ditzen, Business Owners Call Flood of Disability
Suits an Ambush, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 31, 2003, at A l (quoting one business owner's response to being sued
for Title III violations as saying, "[aIre you sure you have the right place?... I've had wheelchairs in here for
21 years .... You could put a golf cart in our men's room").
155. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 47 (including statement of business manager
Terri L. Davis that because plaintiffs are only able to obtain injunctive relief under federal law, they add state
law claims in order to recover money damages).
156. See ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 3-4 (Mar. 10,
2003) (stating that businesses sued for even minor ADA violations can be liable for money damages under state
law, and are often compelled to settle for more than the problem would cost to fix).
157. See Sharp v. Waterfront Rests., No. 99-CV-200, 1999 WL 1095486, at *6 n.l (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2,
1999) (sympathizing with defendant's contention that "vexatious private suits brought by professional ADA
plaintiffs menace innocent businesses and undermine the legitimate purposes of the ADA", but stating that "the
change of law advocated by Defendant must come from Congress, not the courts"); O'Neill Interview, supra
note 110 (discussing issues that AB 209 sought to address).
158. Nos. C 99-1557, C 99-1814, WL 1269191 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14,1999).
159. Id. at*l.
160. Id. at *2.
161. Id. at *3.
162. See id. at *2. (stating that the plaintiff needs to show that the restroom was available to the public
and that his mere assertion was insufficient evidence).
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disabilities are entitled to access that is full and equal to that enjoyed by members
of the general public.163 Because the general public had no right to access the
restroom, the court held that the plaintiffs likewise had no right, and ruled in
favor of the defendant. 164
Louie, who suffers from diabetes and a right leg amputation resulting from
the disease, is not unknown among California business owners. 165 Despite the
fact that Louie does not consume alcohol because of his diabetes, he has sued
more than one hundred wineries in California, alleging that the winery tasting
rooms violate federal and state law because they do not provide full accessibility
to the disabled. 166 The suits, usually brought by Louie in conjunction with a
second plaintiff, often result in settlements averaging close to $10,000 per suit,
with each plaintiff collecting $4,000 in statutory damages, and another $2,000 in
attorney's fees and costs.167 Although Louie claims to be an activist whose goal is
simply to bring businesses into compliance with the law, 168 others condemn him
as a "professional plaintiff," citing the one million dollars in damages and legal
fees Louie's efforts have garnered. 69 His opponents describe his tactics as
tantamount to a "cottage industry," and claim that he is interested only in
money.17
0
Such activism is not confined to California. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a
small group of activists filed nearly forty lawsuits against local businesses,
claiming disability discrimination and demanding money damages and attorney's
fees.17' Waves of lawsuits have also flooded Florida, targeting businesses ranging
in type from diners to strip clubs. A suit was even filed against a store that sold
wheelchairs, suggesting the plaintiffs motive was profit-driven. 17 Some of these
suits include seemingly frivolous claims. 1
73
Additional evidence supports the theory that some plaintiffs are more
interested in recovering damages than advancing public access for individuals
with disabilities. For example, in Botosan v. Fitzhugh,"74 a restaurant patron who
163. See id. at * 1, *3 (setting forth the language and intent behind Title III and the DPA).
164. Id. at *3.
165. Post, supra note 13, at 1.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Fricker, supra note 116, at El (quoting Mr. Louie as saying, "If [businesses] were in
compliance, I'd be put out of business in one day").
169. Id.
170. See id. (reporting opinion of Rob Carrol, a San Francisco attorney who represented approximately
fifty companies sued by Mr. Louie, including approximately thirty-five wineries); Post, supra note 13, at 1
(stating that in 2002, Mr. Louie met with members of the Wine Institute, a San Francisco based association of
wineries, offering not to sue for one year any member winery that agreed to pay him $200).
171. Ditzen, supra note 154, at Al.
172. Id.
173. See id. (discussing suit in which a plaintiff alleged he had suffered emotional distress after finding
that a restaurant he sought to patronize had no van-accessible parking - to which the restaurant's attorney
pointed out that the restaurant had no parking lot).
174. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
679
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required the use of a wheelchair alleged that the restaurant violated ADA Title
IIl, the Unruh Act, the DPA and sections of the California Health and Safety
Code by not providing handicapped parking, wheelchair ramps, accessible
restroom facilities, or accessibility signage.175 Although the plaintiffs complaint
was valid, and the court rejected the defendant's motions for dismissal and
summary judgment, the plaintiffs motives were still questionable. The plaintiff
sought to recover compensatory damages under the ADA, 176 daily damages in the
amount of $1,000 per day (although he only patronized the restaurant once),
damages under California Health and Safety Code section 19955, uncapped
punitive damages under the Unruh Act 177 and the DPA,178 and special damages
based on allegations that he suffered humiliation, frustration, embarrassment and
serious emotional and physical injuries. 179 This particular plaintiff, Kornel
Botosan, filed more than 160 lawsuits in Southern California, demanding
monetary damages in a pattern of conduct that some characterize as a
"shakedown" of local businesses.' 80
These types of suits may lead one to wonder whether plaintiffs such as Louie
and Botosan are heroic activists, carrying the torch for greater disability access,
or self-serving opportunists, looking to make a quick buck.' 81 Even if Louie and
Botosan fall into the latter category, California legislators cannot ignore the
foundational goals of disability law. They must find a way to advance access for
persons with disabilities, while looking for ways to reduce the need for
litigation. 182
Ultimately it is usually lawyers who file lawsuits. This fact has led some to
contend that disability law has turned into "the goose that lays golden eggs" for
greedy attorneys. 8 3 Many business owners and the attorneys who represent them,
refer to the rash of lawsuits seeking damages as "drive-by litigation" because it
appears that either the plaintiff or the attorney is driving around a particular area
looking for businesses to sue. "4
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1051 (striking this portion of plaintiff's complaint because damages are not available
under Title HI).
177. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 51, 51.3 (West 1982).
178. Id. §§ 54.1, 54.3.
179. See Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1051-53 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that this opinion
ruled on defendant's motions, and there is no discussion of the exact nature of the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff, nor is the ultimate outcome of each of the plaintiff's allegations reported).
180. Adam A. Milani, Go Ahead, Make My 90 Days: Should Plaintiffs be Required to Provide Notice to
Defendants Before Filing Suit Under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 107,
132-33 (2001).
181. See generally Hudson Interview, supra note 16 (discussing goals of SB 69); O'Neill Interview,
supra note 110 (discussing goals of AB 209).
182. See generally Hudson Interview, supra note 16 (discussing goals of SB 69); O'Neill Interview,
supra note 110 (discussing goals of AB 209).
183. Hoyem, supra note 152, at 6A.
184. Id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
In sum, although promoting access for individuals with disabilities is an
important and legitimate interest that no one disputes, concerns about misuse of
the law by those whose primary goal is to line their own pockets has some
legislators looking for ways to keep the purpose of the laws in focus.1
85
B. Long Standing Law versus Good Faith Belief
Another facet of the damages controversy lies in the argument that laws
governing disability access have been on the books in California for many
years.' 8 6 Indeed, the most outspoken disability advocates cite the fact that the
DPA has existed since 1968, disability law under the Unruh Act has been around
since 1987, and ADA Title III was enacted in 1990. 87 Thus, it is argued that
business owners are well aware of the laws and have had more than enough time
to come into compliance. 188 Moreover, disability activists assert that non-
compliant business owners and operators simply choose not to comply, and then
become angry when they are "caught."' 189
Most business owners take another view.190 They claim that the long-time
existence of these three laws does not mean that the majority of business owners
are aware of them. 19' Further, some businesses forced to pay thousands of dollars
in settlement or litigation costs face the possibility of going out of business due to
minor or technical violations that might have cost less than five dollars to fix.
92
These businesses merely seek a remedy that is fair to both the aggrieved
individual and the business, particularly where violation was unintentional and
the business owner demonstrates a willingness to comply with the law.1
93
Targeted businesses may escape liability if they fall within one of the various
federal law .194 One exception is triggered when a court determines that renovation or
185. See Hudson Interview, supra note 16 (discussing motivation behind initiation of a notice
requirement bill in California); cf. Hoyem, supra note 152, at 6A (quoting attorney Fields as saying, "[tihe
Americans with Disabilities Act is a great idea. It's just being used incorrectly for a bad purpose").
186. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 5 (Mar. 10, 2003).
187. See Post, supra note 13, at 1 (discussing opinion of George S. Louie).
188. See id. (quoting plaintiff George S. Louie as saying, "How much more notice do they need?").
189. See Hoyem, supra note 152, at 6A (interviewing John Mallah, a Florida attorney who has filed
hundreds of lawsuits based on ADA violations).
190. See, e.g., Sharp v. Waterfront Rests., No. 99-CV-200, 1999 WL 1095486, at *6 n. I (S.D. Cal. Aug.
2, 1999) (discussing business owner's contention that "vexatious private suits brought by professional ADA
plaintiffs menace innocent businesses and undermine the legitimate purposes of the ADA").
191. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 5 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(acknowledging that the ADA was enacted more than twelve years ago, but stating that many businesses that
are in violation of the law are unaware of the violations).
192. Id. at 3-4.
193. See id. at 4 (stating that the cost to defend a lawsuit may be disproportionate to the cost of
correcting the problem, and that many lawsuits are based on minor violations that are technical violations
"rather than deliberate attempts to circumvent the law").
194. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1995) (stating that modifications that would fundamentally
alter the nature of goods, services or facilities offered by a business need not be undertaken); id.
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accommodation is not "readily achievable."' 195 In these cases, a business is excused
from making the renovations. Although courts can often balance the interests of
businesses and persons with disabilities, legislators continue to seek ways to reduce
the need for such litigation and unnecessary consumption of valuable court time.
196
In any case, common sense seems to dictate that anyone hoping to operate a
successful business would not want to turn away a paying customer, whether the
customer walks in unassisted or rolls through the door in a wheelchair. Most business
owners probably prefer compliance so that their doors remain open to all prospective
customers. 1
97
Even owners who believe in good faith that they are in compliance with
disability laws may find themselves in the middle of a non-compliance lawsuit.' 98
These suits take many business owners by surprise because although most are
knowledgeable in business and management practices, they may be unfamiliar
with the numerous legal requirements of running a business. 199 As a result, rather
than facing the prospect of paying statutory damages and attorney's fees and
costs, many businesses settle out of court, often for significantly more than the
violation would have cost to correct.
200
In fact, some business owners have gone to great lengths and expense to have
their facilities examined by inspectors for the very purpose of ensuring
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (providing an undue burden exception); id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v) (providing that removal
of architectural barriers and provision of goods and services must be readily achievable).
195. See id. § 12181(9) (defining "readily achievable" as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried
out without much difficulty or expense" and listing factors to be considered in determining whether an action is
readily achievable, including the nature and cost of the action, the financial resources of the facility, the size of
the facility and number of employees, and the location and nature of the business); see, e.g., Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that fundamental nature of services provided by professional
golfers' association would not be altered by permitting disabled golfer to use golf cart during tournaments),
affd, 532 U.S. 661; Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Concorde Gaming Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Fla.
2001) (holding that installation of an elevator in a casino ship was not "readily achievable" based on a projected
cost of $200,000, the necessity to dry-dock the ship for two months during installation, and the need to obtain
re-certification as a commercial passenger vessel).
196. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 1 (Mar. 10,
2003) (seeking to restrict the need to litigate minor infractions of the law by imposing notice requirements upon
would-be plaintiffs); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at I (Jan. 20, 2004)
(proposing imposition of a pre-litigation notice requirement to provide business owners ninety days to remedy
the access violation).
197. See Post, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting attorney Wendell Lee, staff attorney for the Wine Institute, a
San Francisco based association of wineries, as saying, "Our people are in the hospitality business. They want
to comply").
198. See id. (quoting attorney Rob Carrol who defends businesses sued for Title II and California
disability law violations as saying, "Every one of my clients thought they were in compliance until they got
sued").
199. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 67 (including statement of business manager
Terri L. Davis that she was unaware of any violations, relying upon the consultants hired by the previous
property manager); Milani, supra note 180, at 156 (stating that "[e]ven business owners who are aware of the
accessibility rules are probably unfamiliar with their specifics---especially with regard to technical requirements
like the slope of ramps or bathroom dimensions").
200. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 3 (Mar. 10, 2003).
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compliance with ADA regulations.2°' Yet reliance upon building inspectors is not
an affirmative defense; there is no "reasonable reliance" exception in any of the
laws.202
The DPA, Unruh Act and ADA Title Ell make clear that persons with disabilities
are entitled to full and equal access in places of public accommodation. However,
these laws do not mention requirements pertaining to angles of incline for
wheelchair ramps, size of restroom stalls, or required aisle width in stores.20 3
These details are found in other legislative provisions. 2°4 Many business owners
have relied on the expertise of professionals, such as general contractors and
inspectors, to navigate through the virtually bottomless sea of regulations.
Unfortunately, even these owners are not assured of compliance.20 5
The problem is that the building codes are numerous, complex, and
extremely detailed.20 6 The ADAAG sets forth exact measurements for hundreds,
potentially thousands, of items such as wheelchair seating space width,20 7
maximum ramp slopes, 20 8 pay phone height,209 restroom sink height,2 10 maximum
pounds of pressure required to activate restroom soap dispensers, 2 1 and various
grab bar requirements.2t 2 Moreover, the ADAAG contains six separate provisions
relating to the position and appearance of signs, regulating items such as
character height and proportion, background color, sign finish and mounting
201. See, e.g., ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 45-46 (statement of business manager
Terri L. Davis that her "company hired independent consultants to inspect all the properties ... [and that]
necessary modifications to the properties were ordered and completed shortly thereafter to ensure that to the
best of our knowledge, all of the properties were in compliance with the regulations," but that the company was
nonetheless sued for ADA and California disability law violations).
202. See id.; see also United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 581 n.9 (6th Cir. 2003)
(considering defendant's affirmative defense that it complied with state regulations that had been certified by
the DOJ as meeting or exceeding ADA standards, and that defendant relied upon the certification, but noting
that the "DOJ has expressly stated that certification is not a process on which architects can completely rely");
O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (discussing purposes for proposing AB 209).
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 (1995); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5 1(b), 54.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004).
204. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A (2003).
205. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (discussing difficulty that inspectors encounter when trying
to interpret ADAAG provisions).
206. See Post, supra note 13, at I (noting that there are approximately ninety regulations alone that
govem public restrooms, and describing the multitude of regulations as "minefields," noting there are different
requirements depending on whether an accommodation was built before or after enactment of the laws).
207. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.2.4.1 (requiring thirty inches by forty-eight inches as the
minimum clear floor space to accommodate a single, stationary wheelchair).
208. See id. § 4.8.2 (stating the maximum ramp slope for a newly constructed ramp must be 1:12).
209. Id. § 4.3
210. See id. § 4.24.2 (stating that sink counters should be no higher than thirty four inches above the
floor).
211. See id. § 4.27.4 (stating that the required force shall not exceed five pounds of pressure).
212. See id. § 4.16.4 (stating that grab bars located behind a water closets must be a minimum of thirty-
six inches-although it is not indicated whether this applies to the length of the bar or the height from the
floor-and that the grab bar must also comply with section 4.26 and Figure 29, as well as providing for further
recommendations in the ADAAG's appendix).
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height.21 3 For instance, a sign designating handicapped accessible services must
be mounted at a height of sixty inches, as measured from the finished floor to the
214centerline of the sign.
Indeed, interpreting the many regulations found in the ADAAG has proved
problematic even for judges, who are unquestionably among the most skilled at
interpreting statutes.1 5 The difficulty in interpretation has led to divided court
decisions and splits of authority, requiring architects and contractors to juggle the
various interpretations in determining exactly which construction designs will
comply with the law.216
Considering the interpretation difficulties encountered by judges and design
professionals, what chance do business owners have of understanding the
voluminous provisions when they generally lack any sort of legal or engineering
training?21 7 As a result, even astute business owners who obtained guidance from
and followed recommendations of state contractors, or who obtained approval
from state agencies or architects, have not been exempt from the law if violations
are subsequently identified.218
Another frequent situation involves lawsuits for minor or technical violations
that have little, if any, negative impact on disabled individuals. 2 9 The problem is that
the laws, as they currently stand, make no exception or distinction between minor
and major infractions. 220 Disabled individuals might familiarize themselves with a
few of the more technical requirements of the building codes, like the sixty-inch
height requirement for handicapped signs,22' then simply patronize a store and bring
suit against the owner if the sign, varies even one inch from code.222 Indeed,
213. Id. §§ 4.30-4.30.6.
214. Id. § 4.30.6.
215. See Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1132, 1140, 1143, 1145 (D. Or.
1998) (expressing repeated frustration with numerous provisions of the ADAAG regulations, characterizing
various regulations as circular in definition, lacking adequate specificity, unhelpful at times, and acknowledging
that "there may be instances where the court is either unable to comprehend what regulation requires, or the
explanation proffered by DOJ is simply illogical, or conflicts with the plain language of the regulations").
216. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating the majority's ruling results in a split of authority that will require design
professionals to make architectural inferences rendered obscure and debatable by the split).
217. See id. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (querying "(i]f a judge on the panel cannot say just what is
required, how can a movie theater owner?"); Ditzen, supra note 154, at Al (stating that even ADA experts
admit that "the regulations for the 1990 [ADA] law are so detailed that perfect compliance is almost impossible.
That makes almost any business a potential target for suit").
218. Post, supra note 13, at 1.
219. See, e.g., Fricker, supra note 116, at El (stating that plaintiff George S. Louie sued a California
bank over print on a parking sign that was too small and a wheelchair ramp that was .07 to 3.47 degrees steeper
than required by law).
220. See ASSEMBLY COMMrITEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2003)
(stating that a minor violation, such as a non-compliant door handle that might cost only four dollars to replace,
would nonetheless require payment of $1,000 statutory damages under the DPA).
221. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.30.6 (2003).
222. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52, 54.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004).
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California law entitles these individuals to statutory damages.223 Business owners
have no recourse against these types of suits, and are not entitled to notification of the
infraction prior to the lawsuit.224 Thus, the degree of infraction may be minor or
essentially harmless, yet entitle a plaintiff to recover damages that significantly
exceed the cost to modify, such as a modification requiring a handicapped sign to be
repositioned by one inch.225 Undoubtedly, some minor violations have significant
impact upon individuals, but other violations, such as a one-inch sign displacement,
do not. 226
It is unfair to punish business owners who were aware of the laws, took
affirmative steps to comply, and believed in good faith that they were in
compliance. Moreover, it is possible to conceive of a savvy attorney who directs
multiple plaintiffs to lodge complaints against the same business, forcing the
business to settle, or face paying statutory damages to each plaintiff, plus
attorney's fees and costs. 227 This is not what legislators intended when they
22enacted disability discrimination laws. 28 The laws were intended to make public
places accessible to individuals with disabilities, not provide them with a
convenient cash cow.229 Yet neither the DPA nor ADA Title III requires
discriminatory acts to be intentional. 230 Furthermore, notice is not required underany of the California disability anti-discrimination laws or Title 111.231
IV. ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 872
In October 2003, the California Legislature enacted Chapter 872,232 which
directed the California State Architect to implement a program for voluntary
223. Id.; see Hudson Interview, supra note 16 (discussing motivation behind initiation of a notice
requirement bill in California).
224. Post, supra note 13, at 1.
225. See Hudson Interview, supra note 16 (discussing inequities that SB 69 is intended to address).
226. See, e.g., Fricker, supra note 116, at El (stating that matters that seem insignificant to other
members of the public can be important to a person who uses a wheelchair, such as the height of a grab bar
needed to transfer to a toilet).
227. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (discussing scenario in which an attorney directed ten
disabled individuals to bring suit against one business, compelling a $20,000 settlement from which the attorney
kept $10,000 as his fee).
228. Cf Felsenthal, supra note 13, at B I (referring to the ADA, stating that lawsuits have been filed
over issues not imagined by lawmakers, and speculating that Congress did not realize "the extent to which laws
are stretched out of proportion").
229. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (discussing purpose of California disability law, the need to
provide access, and the goal of imposing reasonable restrictions to protect businesses).
230. See Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (D. Hi. 2000) (stating that the ADA
applies to discriminatory effects resulting from indifference and benign neglect as well as intentional
discrimination); Boemio v. Love's Rest., 954 F. Supp. 204, 207-08 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the DPA does
not require a plaintiff to plead intentional discrimination).
231. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 (West 1995); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54.1 West 1982); see Botosan v. Paul
McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title III does not require plaintiffs to give
notice to any state agency prior to filing suit).
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19958.6(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 872).
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certification of persons as "access specialists" for the purpose of providing
guidance and advice to business owners.233 Although specialists may inspire
more confidence in business owners to rely upon recommendations, the law
provides no safe harbor for such reliance.234 The law imposes strict liability in the
amount of $2,500 for any violation.235 Suit for violation of Chapter 872 must be
brought by either the district attorney, city attorney, or by the Attorney
General,236 and any imposed penalties are directed into a government coffer.237
Proponents of the law recognized that despite the ADA and the various
California laws addressing disability discrimination, persons with disabilities
have continued to experience impeded access to public places of business. 8
Chapter 872 was promulgated to promote compliance and enforcement of
existing laws.239
Conversely, opponents deemed the automatic statutory penalty as "excessive
and duplicative" in light of the fact that the Unruh Act and the DPA already
permit aggrieved persons to collect damages.2 40 The only possible relief for
business owners is a provision permitting a court to suspend a portion of the
penalty, subject to an imposed schedule for correcting violations.24'
V. PROPOSED NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Focusing on the fact that business owners are not entitled to receive notice of
alleged violations prior to suit being brought against them, and with the intent of
providing needed balance between the rights of disabled persons and the rights of
business owners, both federal and state legislators have proposed changes in the
242laws to achieve the desired balance. Protecting the right of persons with
243disabilities to access places of public, accommodation remains paramount.
233. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 4459.5-4459.8 (added by Chapter 872); see SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 2 (Sept. 8, 2003) (stating that the law is designed so that "business owners
who legitimately desire to come into compliance with the [sic] California's access standards can find good
advice and guidance").
234. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19958.6(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 872).
235. See id. § 19958.6(a)-(b) (imposing a "civil penalty of... $2,500 for each violation" and if the
violation remains uncorrected ninety days after the business owner receives written notice from a government
agency, an additional penalty of "not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than... $2,500 for each
violation for each additional day that the violation remains").
236. Id. § 19958.5 (amended by Chapter 872).
237. Id. § 19958.6(e)(l)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 872).
238. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 4 (Sept. 10, 2003).
239. See id, at 5 (quoting the California Attorney General's argument that the point of a significant initial
fine is to deter violations and spur compliance).
240. Id. at 6.
241. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19958.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 872).
242. See infra Part V.A-B.
243. See Inouye's Statement, supra note 117 (stating "[p]lease be assured that I simply want to close a
loophole in the ADA .... I do not suggest or approve of any changes to the ADA that would weaken its
substantive requirements for reasonable accommodation .... [and wle must ensure that the progress begun
more than a decade ago continues as we work to make public accommodations more accessible to everyone").
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Thus, federal and state legislators were faced with the dilemma of how best to
achieve the desired balance.244 Federal legislators settled on an option that
appears to bring ADA Title III into closer alignment with CRA Title I/
requirements.245 Specifically, federal legislators introduced a bill that would
246impose a notice requirement on ADA Title III actions.
A. ADA Title III-The ADA Notification Act Proposition
Title III remedies for private suits are patterned after the injunctive relief
provision found under CRA Title 11.247 Although there was an initial split as to
whether ADA Title III adopted the notice requirement provision of CRA Title II,
California case law ultimately concluded that there is no notice requirement
under ADA Title III.248 Defendant business owners adversely affected by
plaintiffs' manipulation of the law must lobby the Legislature, rather than the
249courts, to respond to their concerns.
In 2000, federal legislators introduced the ADA Notification Act.2 The
proposed law would require an individual to provide a business with written
ninety-day notice of perceived ADA Title III violations prior to filing suit.
251
The primary sponsor of the bill, Rep. Mark Foley (R-Fla.), believed the notice
requirement would effectively end the "blizzard of lawsuits" filed by "rogue
attorneys. 252 The notice requirement would have given business owners an
opportunity to correct violations prior to being subject to suit.25 3 However,
businesses that did not begin to make necessary modifications would remain
subject to suit.
4
244. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 132 (including statement of Melvin L. Watt,
member of the Subcomm. on the Constitution, considering arguments on the proposed ADA Notification Act,
and stating that "I am a legislator, I am in the middle here, I am trying to work toward a solution to a problem");
ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 6 (Mar. 10, 2003) (discussing the
goal of eliminating the disproportionate price gap between the cost of achieving compliance and the cost of
litigating claims).
245. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1995).
246. H.R. 3590, 106th Cong. (2000).
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(a)(1); id. § 2000a-3(a).
248. Sharp v. Waterfront Rests., No. 99-CV-200, 1999 WL 1095486, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1999).
249. See id. at *6 n.1 (sympathizing with defendant's contention that "vexatious private suits brought by
professional ADA plaintiffs menace innocent businesses and undermine the legitimate purposes of the ADA,"
but stating that "the change of law advocated by Defendant must come from Congress, not the courts").
250. H.R. 3590, 106th Cong, (2000); see Milani, supra note 180, at 110 (discussing events leading up to
the proposed federal notification bill).
251. Milani, supra note 180, at 110.
252. Id.
253. See H.R. 3590, 106th Cong. (2000) (requiring plaintiff to provide defendant with notice of the
alleged violation, followed by a ninety day waiting period requirement before commencing a civil action).
254. See id. (allowing plaintiff to file suit at the expiration of the ninety day waiting period if the
defendant had not corrected the alleged violation).
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Many disability advocates vehemently opposed the bill, arguing that a
notification requirement would eliminate all incentive for business owners to
voluntarily comply with access requirements.5 Moreover, it seems patently
unfair to require the victims of disability discrimination, who already suffer the
daily frustration of being denied access to places and services, to shoulder the
additional burden of providing notice to violators. Then, after giving notice,
victims of discrimination must wait for modifications to occur--during which
time they continue to be denied access.256 Furthermore, some argue that no other
class of persons alleging violation of their civil rights is required to provide the
defendant with notice before filing suit.257 Ultimately, the federal bill failed, but
was proposed anew in 2001258 and 2003.259 Currently, no federal notice
requirement has been enacted.
B. California's Approach to a Notice Requirement
Like federal legislators, California legislators sought to balance the interests
of business owners with the rights of persons with disabilities, reduce litigation,
260
and virtually eliminate suits based on minor and easily correctible infractions.
In light of California's history of providing for the right to recover damages for
violations of the Unruh Act and the DPA, it was unlikely that elimination of such
damages would be pursued by the legislators. Instead, like the federal legislature,
California proposed a notice requirement.261
255. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 62 (including statement by Christine Griffin,
Executive Director of Disability Law Center, Inc., Boston, MA that enactment of the ADA Notification Act
would eliminate the incentive for voluntary compliance by businesses, and would simply allow business owners
to take the chance that they will not be sued).
256. See id. at 53 (including statement of disabled individual Kyle Glozier of New Freeport,
Pennsylvania in opposition to H.R. 3590, stating "I always have to be segregated from my classmates to enter
the building that we are visiting [during school field trips]. What if this building was not accessible? Why
should I have to wait 90 days to file a lawsuit?").
257. See id. at 54 (including statement of disabled individual Kyle Glozier of New Freeport,
Pennsylvania); but see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (describing the notice requirement under CRA
Title H at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c)).
258. H.R. 914, 107th Cong. (2001).
259. S. 782, 107th Cong. (2001); HR 728, 108th Cong. (2003).
260. Hudson Interview, supra note 16; see Letter of Co-Author Request from Senator Rico Oiler, First
Senatorial District of Cal., to Fellow Legislators (Jan. 21, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(stating that because existing compliance requirements are complex and confusing, "it is only fair to give
property owners a chance to repair their facilities before being hauled into court," and acknowledging that under
current law, "even minor and harmless violations of little-known and ever-changing federal regulations
constitute illegal discrimination under state law"); O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (stating that the issue is
not about denying access, but relieving businesses from unfair threats and finding a compromise to "get things
done").
261. See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209 (Mar. 10,
2003); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69 (Jan. 20, 2004).
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1. The Proposals-S.B. 69 and A.B. 209
Taking their lead from federal proposals, California Senator Rico Oiler and
Assemblyman Tim Leslie proposed similar legislation in 2003 to amend the
DPA.262 Senate Bill 69 ("S.B. 69"), sponsored by Senator Oiler, sought to impose
a notice requirement on individuals with disabilities who believed that a business
failed to provide them with equal access as required by the DPA, the Unruh Act,
or Section 4450 of the Government Code.263
Under S.B. 69, the aggrieved individual would be required to send a certified
letter identifying the specific access problem to the owner or manager of the
facility.264 The aggrieved individual would be entitled to receive a return letter
describing the improvements to remedy the problem.265 Within ninety days of
receiving notice, the owner or manager must act in good faith to correct the
problem and make any necessary improvements. However, the improvements
need not be fully completed within that time frame. 266 During the ninety-day
period, the disabled individual could not file a related lawsuit against the
business.2 67 If a suit was filed within that timeframe, a successful plaintiff would
not be entitled to recover attorney's fees, treble damages, or any other costs
under the damages provision of the DPA.268
Assembly Bill 209 ("A.B. 209"), initiated by Assemblyman Leslie, proposed
a notice requirement that would provide some protection for small businesses
that demonstrate good faith efforts to comply with the ADA.269 Under A.B. 209,
an aggrieved individual would be required to provide violation notice to small
business via a certified letter. The letter must detail the alleged ADA violations
and the date and location at which the violation occurred. 270 The business then
would have sixty days to correct the alleged problems, and the individual could
file suit only if the business failed to correct the problem within sixty days.271
262. See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209 (Mar. 10,
2003); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69 (Jan. 20, 2004).
263. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54.1 (West 1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 4450 (West 1992); SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at 5 (Jan. 20, 2004).
264. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at 5 (Jan. 20, 2004).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 3.
268. Id. at 6; CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3 (West 1982).
269. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(defining "small business" as one having fewer than fifty employees).
270. Id.
271. Id.
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Under A.B. 209, plaintiffs would be required to make reasonable efforts to
inform a large business of alleged ADA violations, and allow the business sixty
days to correct the violation prior to filing suit.z72 A plaintiffs failure to provide
the sixty-day notice to a large business would limit the plaintiff's damages
recovery to $2,000 per violation.273
2. Analysis of S.B. 69 and A.B. 209
Early in 2004, both S.B. 69 and A.B. 209 failed to pass. Senate Bill 69 failed
to acquire enough votes during its first committee hearing,274 while Assembly
Bill 209 expired because of time limitations set forth in the California
275Constitution. Because notice requirement legislation continues to fail, an
examination of the strengths and weaknesses of such legislation is warranted.
First, state and federal disability laws are independent of each other. Thus,
notice requirements imposed under state law would not affect a plaintiff s right to
bring immediate suit based on a claim under ADA Title 111.276 Accordingly, a
plaintiff may seek to enjoin a Title HI violator without providing notice to the
business owner.277 The successful plaintiff could enjoin a business from denying
access, the plaintiffs attorney would recover his or her fee, and the business
would be compelled to correct the violation.278
Proponents of the California notice requirements contend that a notice
requirement is a fair and reasonable means to address a variety of problems
facing good faith business owners.27 9 The burden of sending a letter to notify a
business of an alleged violation is arguably slight as compared to the costs
incurred by a business to defend a lawsuit, which may in some cases be grossly
disproportionate to the cost of remedying the violation. 280 Good faith business
272. See id. (defining "large business" as one having fifty or more employees).
273. Id.
274. See S.B. 69, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), Complete Bill History, at http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_- 0051-0100/sb69bill20040202_history.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (stating that
the bill failed to pass by a committee vote of two to five).
275. See A.B. 209, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), Current Bill Status, at http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_0201-0250/ab 209 bill20040205-status.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (stating that
the bill died "pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 10(c) of the [California] Constitution).
276. ASSEMBLY COMM1I-rEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 6 (Mar. 10, 2003).
277. See id. (stating that an aggrieved individual could obtain equitable relief and attorney's fees to
remedy a Title III violation).
278. Id.
279. See id., at 4 (providing supporting opinion of the National Federation of Independent Business,
stating that "[t]his bill provides a simple legal mechanism that allows employers to address the violation and
move on without the egregious costs of a court battle").
280. Id.; cf Snyder v. San Diego Flowers, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210-11 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (construing
ADA Title HI to contain an administrative exhaustion requirement, reasoning that a notice requirement would
"solve access problems more efficiently than allowing all violators to be dragged into litigation regardless of
their willingness to comply voluntarily with the ADA once informed of its infractions") (abrogated by Botosan
v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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owners may avoid being coerced to defend a costly lawsuit, and could instead
finance the necessary access modifications. 28' Non-compliant or bad-faith
business owners may be sued and enjoined, thus compelling them to comply with
the law.282 Disabled persons would gain increased access for the mere cost of
mailing a letter. 283 This appears to be a "win-win" situation.
However, opponents contend that the notice requirement tips decidedly
against the interests of persons with disabilities. 284 The law already requires that
285
businesses make their goods and services available to disabled persons. Why
should disabled persons be required to take an additional step of mailing a
certified letter? Why should the burden be upon the already-aggrieved party to
inform business owners of laws about which the owners should already be
aware? Additionally, after mailing the letter, an aggrieved individual would be
required to wait for repairs to be made, during which time they continue to be
denied access to the facility, or compensation for the exclusion. 86 Finally,
imposing a notice requirement permits business owners to avoid taking
affirmative steps to make their facilities accessible, unless and until they receive
a notification letter.287
The answer may be "balance." Courts and legislators have suggested that
because many building inspectors do not fully understand the law and complex
regulations, it is implausible to expect business owners to properly interpret
them.288 Therefore, it is virtually impossible to expect complete adherence to the
281. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 3 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(stating that "[miany small businesses cannot afford lawsuits brought against them so that they are settling out
of court for more than what the violation would cost to fix").
282. See id. at 2 (establishing procedural hurdles that plaintiffs must comply with, not elimination of the
right to seek redress).
283. See id. at 6 (stating that a small business is not afforded all the protections of AB 209 when the
plaintiff complies with the procedural hurdles, and "the business has not corrected the alleged violation within
60 days of receiving the notice").
284. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at 4 (Jan. 20, 2004)
(expressing the opinion of opponents to SB 69, "that imposing unnecessary and unprecedented pre-litigation
hurdles on disabled persons would result in yet another inequity, since no other protected class of persons is
subject to such procedural hurdles. It would be tantamount... to punishing the larger community of persons
with disabilities and medical conditions for the sins of a few and their lawyers").
285. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 (1995); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54.1 (West 1982).
286. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at 5 (Jan. 20, 2004) (stating
that after receiving a certified letter of alleged violations, a business owner would have ninety days to "act in
good faith to make appropriate access improvements").
287. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 62 (providing statement of Christine Griffin,
Executive Director, Disability Law Center, Inc. regarding ADA notification bill, that "[plassage of this
notification requirement would clearly remove the primary incentive for businesses to take the initiative to
ensure access to their goods and services").
288. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1134 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting) (querying "[i]f a judge on the panel cannot say just what is required, how can a movie theater
owner?"); Ditzen, supra note 154, at Al (stating that even ADA experts admit that 'the regulations for the 1990
[ADA] law are so detailed that perfect compliance is almost impossible. That makes almost any business a
potential target for suit").
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law, despite good faith efforts.289 Moreover, disabled persons are not altogether
denied the opportunity to bring suit, because a notice requirement would simply
call for certain procedures to be followed for the purpose of obtaining business
compliance, before filing suit for failure to comply. 290 The California Legislature
may presume that business owners have an incentive to accommodate all
potential customers, and that they will take steps to make their facilities as
accessible as reasonably possible.291
For advocates who seek to expand access for persons with disabilities to
public accommodations, a sixty- or ninety-day waiting period is not overly
burdensome when the result potentially may benefit thousands of disabled
persons.292 Although placing the burden of the notice requirement upon the
aggrieved individual is unfair to some degree, the decision to propose such a
requirement appears to be a legislative response to the actions of a handful of
greedy plaintiffs and attorneys.293 Moreover, although aggrieved individuals
contend that they would continue to be denied access during the sixty- or ninety-
day notice period, litigation typically is far more time consuming than the notice
requirement waiting period.294 Finally, because the ultimate goal is business
compliance and access for persons with disabilities, good faith effort and
compromise is integral to any meaningful solution.295
Although both of the California bills were drafted with the goal of equitable
balance in mind,296 there are some logistical problems with some of the
provisions. Senate Bill 69 sought to eliminate the recovery of attorney's fees in
certain cases as a disincentive to golden-egg-seeking attorneys.297 However,
denying attorney's fees and costs may go too far.298 Without the ability to recover
289. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (stating that because the many guidelines are difficult to
interpret, there is virtually no way to get complete compliance).
290. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(discussing procedural hurdles imposed by AB 209).
291. O'Neill Interview, supra note 110; Hudson Interview, supra note 16.
292. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (stating that business owners must act in good faith to
comply with access laws, but that they should be given reasonable time to comply).
293. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 5 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(acknowledging that there continues to be widespread non-compliance with ADA regulations, but stating that
many business owners may be unaware of the violation, and as a result face potential financial ruin because of
the damages that a victim may recover).
294. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 135 (stating that 'if you file a lawsuit in Federal
court, if you take it to trial, it is going to be 18 months or 2 years").
295. O'Neill Interview, supra note 110.
296. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at 4 (Jan. 20, 2004) (stating
that the goal is to permit businesses an opportunity to come into compliance with the ADA before being subject
to suit); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 3 (Mar. 10, 2003) (stating
that the goal is to restrict the ability of plaintiffs to recover statutory damages for minor and easily correctible
violations).
297. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 69, at 4 (Jan. 20, 2004) (stating
opinion of Senator Oiler that "this bill is necessary because '[u]nscrupulous lawyers have been running what is
tantamount to an extortion racket on businesses throughout California...'").
298. See id. at 6 (expressing opinion of opposition that recovery of attorney's fees and costs is necessary
because without them, plaintiffs could not afford to file suits against non-compliant businesses).
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attorney's fees and costs, even legitimate complaints may not be filed for fear of
having to pay one's own attorney's fees.2 99
Similarly, under A.B. 209, aggrieved persons must both provide notice and
acquire the employment information of the business to determine whether the
business is "small" or "large." 3°° Legislators have legitimate concerns about
protecting small businesses from potential hardship or failure. 30' However, by
creating a distinction between small and large businesses, the Legislature
imposes a more significant burden on aggrieved individuals.30 2
Alternatively, notice requirements give rise to certain political issues.
Proponents of S.B. 69 and A.B. 209 admit that efforts aimed at reducing the
incidence of litigation, and in turn reducing attorney's fees, begets a highly
partisan dispute.30 3 It has been suggested that some trial lawyers, in the name of
civil rights, file lawsuits for their own benefit and advantage.3° Historically,
Democrats have not favored federal bills requiring notice.305 Thus, a successful
proposal will require a compromise that benefits all interested parties.
306
Although the California Senate and Assembly each sought to strike an
equitable balance between competing interests of disabled persons and business
owners, both proposed bills ultimately failed.307 These failures may indicate that
a majority of the California Legislature endorses strong protections for disabled
persons, or perhaps that partisanship prevailed, or that the proposed bills offered
unacceptable compromises.
VI. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
The ADA adopts a forward-looking approach to providing access for the
disabled.30 8 Accordingly, higher standards apply to the regulation, design and
construction of new facilities, as compared to existing facilities, which are only
required to make "readily achievable" modifications. 309 Therefore, with the
construction or alteration of each successive building or facility, access for
299. Id.
300. See id. at 2 (requiring that notice be given to businesses with fifty or fewer employees, but requiring
only reasonable effort to provide notice to businesses with more than fifty employees).
301. See id. at 3-4 (discussing hardships faced by targeted businesses).
302. See id. at 7 (opposing AB 209, stating that "only victims of disability discrimination are singled out
for the special obligations and higher liability standard established [by A.B. 209]").
303. O'Neill Interview, supra note 110; Hudson Interview, supra note 16.
304. O'Neill Interview, supra note 110; Hudson Interview, supra note 16.
305. See ADA Notification Act: 2003 Bill Tracking H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2003) (listing co-sponsors of
the bill as including fifty-four Republicans and two Democrats).
306. See id. (stating that proponents of a notice requirement must be willing to compromise with the
other side to find common ground and get things done).
307. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
308. 136 CONG. REC. E1913-01, *E1919 (May 22, 1990) (speech of Hon. Steny H. Hoyer).
309. Id.
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disabled persons to an increasing number of accommodations should likewise
increase.
The previous failure of federal notice requirement bills likely foreshadowed
the fate of S.B. 69 and A.B. 209." ° The senate and assembly members
introducing the California bills were not taken unaware. 3"1 One might wonder
why legislators would propose bills they know are likely to fail. The answer
given is that solutions to problems, even solutions initially rejected, must begin
somewhere. 312 Ideas must be born and shared and the public needs to be
educated about important issues facing minority groups, business owners, and the
California and Federal Legislatures.313 Public exposure to potential solutions
stimulates popular support, and promotes development of resolutions.
314
For the time being, California does not impose a notice requirement upon
individuals before filing disability discrimination claims against owners and
operators of public businesses.31 5 Any successful legislative enactment will likely
require compromise.31 6 Meanwhile, business owners continue to be subject to
surprise lawsuits.317 Should a notice requirement eventually be enacted, it would
seem fair to exempt the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief or temporary
318restraining orders from the notice requirement.
One possible solution that has been suggested involves a safe harbor
provision for business owners who rely in good faith upon direction and
recommendations from access specialists certified under Chapter 872.319 Those
who argue for such changes suggest that with access specialist approval, a
business would obtain a certificate identifying that the business met and
complied with ADA standards and regulations.32 ° Once certified, the business
would have a good-faith defense to subsequent lawsuits, entitling it to notice of
alleged violations prior to being sued.321 Those not certified would not be entitled
322to notice.





315. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
316. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (discussing possible alternatives to protect the interests of
both disabled individuals and business owners, and the need for compromise).
317. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMIT'EE ANALYSIS OF AB 209, at 3-4 (Mar. 10,
2003) (commenting on the need to protect good-faith businesses).
318. See ADA Notification Subcomm., supra note 13, at 102 (including statement of Minneapolis
attorney Christopher G. Bell).
319. See O'Neill Interview, supra note 110 (discussing possible alternatives to protect the interests of
both disabled individuals and business owners).
320. A.B. 2594, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
321. Id.
322. ld.
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Alternatively, Assemblywoman Ellen Corbett proposed a bill that would
increase the availability of damages under section 54.3 of the California Civil
Code from $1,000 to $4,000. The proposal would prohibit recovery of treble and
statutory damages in lawsuits filed against small businesses unless the plaintiff
proves that his or her access to the facility was actually impaired, or that he or
she suffered actual physical harm.323
It is apparent from the various failed and pending California bills that
legislators continue to struggle for an equitable means of striking balance
between the various competing interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
California and federal disability law seeks to promote public access for
disabled individuals.324 The statutory scheme in California, incorporating both
state and federal law, imposes strict requirements upon business owners, and
does not provide a good-faith exceptions.325 Thus, it has been argued that some
litigious plaintiffs and attorneys are manipulating the laws for the purpose of
recovering statutory damages and attorney's fees, rather than for the purpose of
advancing access for disabled individuals.326
In response to the outcry from business owners, some California legislators
have attempted to impose a notice requirement that would provide good-faith
business owners with the opportunity to correct minor or technical violations
prior to being sued.327 Whether the imposition of such a notice requirement
would be fair or not, every federal and state attempt to pass such legislation has
failed.328
Enactment of Chapter 872 imposes further potential liability for damages
upon business owners by creating strict liability for various violations of the
California Government or Health and Safety Code.32 9 Undeterred, California
legislators continue to seek alternative means of balancing the interests of
disabled persons and business owners. 330 There is much at stake for all
concerned. Any ultimate resolution must take into account the concerns and
interests of both.33'
323. See generally A.B. 1707, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (defining "small business" as one with
fewer than ten employees).
324. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
325. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54.1 (West 1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 4450 (1995); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19955 (1992).
326. See supra Part IHI.A.
327. See supra Part V.B.1.
328. See supra notes 258-59, 275-76 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part IV.
330. O'Neill Interview, supra note 110.
331. Id.

